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Abstract
In order to ensure the provision of goods and services from forests, many governments
have promoted less-traditional conservation initiatives such as programs of payments for
ecosystem services called, more broadly, direct payments for conservation. The Socio Bos-
que Program (SBP) is a governmental program in Ecuador that directly provides economic
incentives to rural families and local and indigenous communities who have voluntarily
agreed to comply with some conservation activities. An impact evaluation method (match-
ing) was used to assess the impact of the SBP between 2008 and 2014. This study revealed
that on average, the SBP reduced deforestation by 1.5% in those forests that received the
SBP’s direct payment. These forests would have been deforested if the SBP had not been
implemented. Assessment of the impact of the SBP on individual and collective contracts,
using the matching method, revealed that 3.4% and roughly 1% of the forest would have
been deforested in the absence of the program, respectively. In other words, the protected
area in the collective SBP was 1,247,500 ha and, if the SBP had not been implemented, an
area of 11,227 ha would have been lost between 2008 and 2014. The 165,700 ha protected
by the individual SBP, it was estimated that 5,733 ha were not deforested due to the imple-
mentation of the conservation program. Conventional estimates of the impact of the SBP
tend to overestimate avoided deforestation because they do not control for observable
covariates that correlate with or affect both SBP participation and deforestation. The conclu-
sions are robust, even given potential hidden biases. The present study demonstrated that
the SBP serves to mitigate the effects of climate change, especially with those contracts
that are intended for individual owners.
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Introduction
Tropical forests play an important role in the regulation of the global climate system through
the storage of large carbon reserves [1, 2], and the regulation of energy and water flows [3].
The release of carbon into the atmosphere due to deforestation and forest degradation is the
second-largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [4]. The XIII Conference of the Par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change created the Bali Action
Plan, which emphasized the need to search for incentive mechanisms for developing countries
to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) [5].
Governments play an important role in the mitigation of GHGs, because forests are key-
stones in the provision and regulation of ecosystem services such as carbon storage [6, 7].
Accordingly, to ensure the provision of forest ecosystem services, some governments have
implemented mechanisms such as payments for ecosystem services; these have been widely
documented [8–13] and are considered the most direct way to comply with conservation goals
[14].
Conservation professionals and decision makers have begun to more carefully assess the
impact of payments for ecosystem services, funded by national governments, on social and
environmental outcomes [15–17], and how these impacts vary spatially [18]. Despite these
efforts, little is known about the impact of payments for ecosystem services [16].
One of the challenges of assessing the impact of payments for ecosystem services relates to
determining the rate of deforestation that would have occurred had the program not been
implemented, called the counterfactual scenario [19], which is known as the casual effect of
the program when compared with the actual rate of deforestation that occurs with the program
[20, 21]. Clearly, it is impossible to observe the two outcomes in the same individual partici-
pant at the same time. If the program did not exist, the outcome of the individual participant
(i.e., the counterfactual scenario) would be hypothetical and, consequently, not directly
observed [22, 23].
Most assessments of the impact of payments for ecosystem services and conservation poli-
cies have, in general, been conducted mainly in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Indonesia [9, 18, 19,
24–27], and very few studies have been conducted in the tropical Andean forest [28–30],
which is recognized for its high capacity to mitigate the effects of GHGs and its huge biological
diversity. A robust assessment of the impact of payments for ecosystem services on these eco-
systems will make it possible to improve the design and focus of conservation programs, thus
avoiding the release of carbon into the atmosphere due to deforestation and degradation of the
tropical Andean forest.
We chose Ecuador because it is widely known for being the most mega-diverse country per
unit of area [31, 32]. Currently Ecuador is a leader in the debate to have ‘avoided deforestation
credits’ recognized by international climate-change conventions. It also had one of the top
deforestation rates during the 1980s and 1990s [33], driven mainly by the expansion of cattle
grazing, agrarian reform and cacao and banana production [34, 35]. In 1980, Ecuador had
approximately 15.5 million hectares of forests, and from 1990 to 2014, continental Ecuador
lost approximately 1.8 million hectares of forest and approximately 5.8 million hectares were
assigned to legal protection [36].
The Ecuadorian SBP program is an example of a conservation program aimed at preventing
the loss of forests and maintaining carbon reserves [37]. The SBP is likely to enable storage of
722 million tons of CO2eq [38] in the whole of Ecuador. Currently, Ecuadorian carbon
reserves are approximately 1,500 million tons, and the equivalent carbon dioxide not emitted
into the atmosphere is 5,621 million tons [39]. Thus, the goal of the SBP is to protect around
3.6 million ha of native forest and other ecosystems of global importance for biodiversity
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conservation, thereby reducing rates of deforestation and associated GHG emission and
increasing incomes and protecting human capital in communities with high poverty rates [6,
37].
To date, 55.6 billion dollars have been invested in SBP, and 1.5 million ha of forests, moors
and mangroves have been protected [37]. Landowner contracts are for 20 years, and incentives
are based on the amount of land enrolled, not its value. For example, the first 50 ha of land
receives US$30 ha-1 year-1, the second 50 ha receives US$20 ha-1 year-1 and so on [40, 41].
Even though the goals of the SBP are targeted at nature and society [42], its impact on the
deforestation of the tropical Andean forest is unknown, although these ecosystems are recog-
nized for their high capacity to mitigate GHG effects and their biological diversity [31, 32, 43].
Socio Bosque is part of Ecuador’s national REDD+ strategy, which is currently under construc-
tion, specifically under the component of incentive-based policies, in this case for the conser-
vation of forests. The SBP furthermore sheds light on possible benefit-sharing mechanisms for
REDD+ [6].
The SBP has great potential to reduce deforestation and ensure carbon stocks by the conser-
vation of tropical Andean forest, and therefore we estimated, for the first time, the impact of
this program via individual and collective contracts on loss of forest area. The SBP was selected
because it is a government-funded national program that transfers economic incentives
directly to rural families and to local and indigenous communities that have voluntarily agreed
to comply with clearly agreed-upon conservation activities [6].
More specifically, the goal of the present study was to estimate the impact of the SBP on
avoided deforestation in the tropical Andean forest between 2008 and 2014. The measurement
of the impact of the SBP was based on the estimation of a counterfactual scenario, which
allowed us to answer the following research question: How much tropical Andean forest
would have been lost in the absence of the SBP? The results of the present study showed that
SBP was more effective for individual contracts than it was for collective contracts. This infor-
mation will allow decision makers to improve the allocation of financial resources, as well as to
adapt and focus the efforts of the SBP within the national framework of financial sustainability,
biodiversity conservation and climate change.
Materials and methods
Data
The present study estimated the causal impact of the SBP on avoided deforestation after 2008
at the national level in continental Ecuador (Fig 1). To that end, we used a random sample of
300,000 units of observation of 30 x 30 m on the map of Ecuador. The final sample of the anal-
ysis included 279,000 cells, because we excluded cells that were not forests in 2008. In addition,
the random sample was focused on two types of SBP contract (i.e. individual and collective).
The dependent variable was deforestation between 2008 and 2014. Any area with forest in
2008 that was converted to non-forest in 2014 was considered deforested and was assigned a
value of 1. Areas covered by forest in 2008 that were not converted to non-forest in 2014 were
assigned a value of 0.
To estimate the change in forest cover, we used maps based on Landsat-5 TM satellite
images obtained from 2008 to 2014. These maps were generated by the SBP and contrasted in
locus during 61 field trips, during which 699 reference points, 3,591 calibration points, and
1,245 validation points were recorded [36, 37].
With respect to SBP contracts (the SBP provides payments per hectare to forest owners
biannually based on 20-year contracts), we received spatial information from the Ecuadorian
Ministry of the Environment (MAE) that included all members who were involved in the
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program for each year during the period of analysis (2008–2014), including individual and col-
lective SBP contracts.
To properly characterize the treated groups and to find similar untreated groups, the infor-
mation about land cover was combined with spatially explicit information on covariates that
affected both the areas with and without the SBP.
In this way, we resolved the key problem faced by observational studies (i.e., the confound-
ing factors that might influence the estimation of the effects of treatment) [44]. Based on the
literature review regarding the effectiveness of conservation policies [19, 28, 45–47], we used
the following confounding variables: altitude, slope, distance to national roads, distance to
local roads, distance to villages, distance to rivers, distance to forest borders, average rainfall
and average temperature. These variables were generated from information maps of the MAE.
Methods
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was implemented using one-to-one, one-to-two and one-
to-three nearest neighbor matches, without replacement [19, 48] and by using a proper control
group to estimate what would have happened if the treatment―in this case, the SBP―had not
been implemented [22, 49]. The PSM was defined as the probability that one cell might be allo-
cated for conservation under SBP. To estimate this probability, we assigned the value 0 to cells
without the SBP and 1 for cells with the SBP. The matching technique [50–52] was used to
match cells with the SBP (or “treatment cells”) with cells without the SBP (also called “control
cells”) that had the most similar probability.
The PSM allowed reduction of the differences between the treated group and the control
group in the set of characteristics that influence the propensity to be in a cell with the SBP,
which, in turn, affect the variable of impact of interest (deforestation, in this case).
Fig 1. Locations of the study area (A). Individual contracts are located closer to deforested area than collective contracts (B).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203545.g001
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To improve the covariance balance, we complement the propensity score matching using
another matching algorithm called “matching with calipers” which consisted of defining a
level of tolerance to judge the quality of the matching. [50]. This alternative matching algo-
rithm allowed us to verify the robustness of the results to different matching strategies. Thus, if
a treated cell matched an untreated observation whose propensity score was not within the cal-
iper, it was excluded from the analysis.
Following Pfaff, Robalino [53], we adjusted for remaining bias by running OLS with the
matched sample. This controls for remaining sources of bias after matching.
Test of differences in standardized means
To judge if the matching technique improved the similarity between the observations of the
treatment and control groups, we performed a balance test of covariates in the sample before
and after the matching procedure through calculation of normalized differences. This is pref-









where X is the mean, σt2 is the variance within the SBP, σc2 is the variance outside the SBP, “t”
means land within the SBP (treatment) and “c” land outside the SBP (control). The golden
rule of difference in normalized differences is that, when it is greater than 0.25, it may distort
the regression estimate [55].
Sensitivity test
When the PSM is used, the main identifying assumption is that there are no non-observed var-
iables that affect the probability of conservation and, at the same time, deforestation. In the
case that such non-observable variables occur, the differences observed between cells with and
without the SBP cannot be entirely attributed to the program, and the estimate of impact will
be biased.
In order to test the robustness of the impact estimates, we used the sensitivity analysis pro-
posed by Rosenbaum [49] and Wilcoxon’s test, which assumes that each unit of observation
has a fixed value for a non-observed covariate (or a composite of non-observed covariates).
The higher the range level (Γ) in which the inference of the estimated effect of the SBP on
deforestation does not change, the more confidence in the conclusion that the estimation of
the causal effect is not affected by a non-observed difference [55].
Results
Table 1 shows the impact estimates of the SBP on avoided deforestation. The measurement of
avoided deforestation using a conventional method (without controlling for other variables)
revealed that 5.1% of the cells with the SBP would have been deforested between 2000 and
2014 had they not been included in the SBP in 2000. The estimate of avoided deforestation
using the PSM technique revealed that between 1.4% and 1.5% of the cells with the SBP would
have been deforested between 2000 and 2014 in the absence of the program. When we used
matching with calipers, the estimate of the impact of the SBP on avoided deforestation was
1.4% (p< 0.01). The analysis using one-to-one, one-to-two and one-to-three nearest neighbor
matching without replacement of the impact of the SBP indicated that it does vary widely for
individual and collective contracts. The results show that 3.4% and roughly 1% of the forest
Avoided deforestation in the tropical Andean forest
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would have been deforested in the absence of the SBP for individual and collective contracts,
respectively.
Given that differences within some covariates might still remain after matching, we also ran
a regression using the matched PSM sample to eliminate any remaining bias (see Table 1 bias
adjustment using PSM sample). The results for all SBP contracts and for the SBP-collective
contracts do not vary substantially. However, the estimated impact of SBP individual contracts
more than double reaching 8 percentage points. These results confirm our hypotheses that
SBP individual contracts have a significant and negative effect on deforestation and that these
effects are significantly larger than SBP collective contracts.
If the areas with and without the SBP differ in characteristics that not only affect the conser-
vation of the forests but also determine changes in forest cover, these differences could not be
entirely attributed to the program [16]. The comparisons of the differences in the distribution
of the covariates between cells with and without SBP showed significant differences in the
means before matching. Therefore, if the results of the matching technique were effective,
these two measures (fifth column in Table 2) should be zero or close to this value in the
matched sample. Analysis of the covariates using the matching technique indicated that the
balance of covariates improved substantially after matching, and biases in observable variables
were minimized (Table 2).
Matching decreased differences in the distribution of all covariates to a large extent, as
shown by the differences in mean values and normalized differences in Table 2 [56].
The results of Table 1 are also robust to different matching strategies. In particular, when
using different numbers of matched control units by treated observation (the closest neighbor,
one-to-two or one-to-three), the results do not vary significantly.
To put these findings into context, the protected area in the collective SBP was 1,247,500 ha
and, if the SBP had not been implemented, an area of 11,227 ha would have been lost in 2014.
On the other hand, of the 165,700 ha protected by the individual SBP, it was estimated that
5,733 ha were prevented from being deforested due to the implementation of the conservation
program.
Table 1. Estimated impacts of SBP on avoided deforestation.
SBP SBP-collective SBP-individual
No. of program cells (treatment) 30,439 27,733 2,706
No. of control cells 260,050 260,050 260,050
Conventional Approach
Naive t-test -0.0511a -0.0525a -0.056a
OLS with covariates -0.0219a -0.0182a -0.0568a
Matched sample using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)b
PSM (n = 1) -0.0150a -0.0090a -0.0346a
PSM (n = 2) -0.0143a -0.0084a -0.0328a
PSM (n = 3) -0.0146a -0.0085a -0.0334a
Calipers (c = 0.01) (n = 1) -0.0143a -0.0090a -0.060a
Bias adjustment using PSM matched sample
PSM (n = 1) -0.0154a -0.010a -0.0801a
PSM (n = 2) -0.0137a -0.0093a -0.0787a
PSM (n = 3) -0.0140a -0.094a -0.0799a
Note.
aSignificant estimates—p< 0.05
bStandard error for post-matching estimates using the variance formula (Abadie & Imbens, 2008).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203545.t001
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Sensitivity test
The non-observed heterogeneity between the conserved and non-conserved areas by the SBP
is presented in S1 Table. The range changes the probability of rejecting the hypothesis. The
higher the range level (Γ) in which the inference of the estimated effect of the SBP on defores-
tation does not change, the more confidence in the conclusion that the estimate of the causal
effect is not affected by a non-observed difference (S1 Table). In other words, the second col-
umn in Annex C indicates that the estimate that 1.5% of deforestation was deterred by the SBP
remained significant and different from zero, even in the presence of moderate non-observed
biases.
Discussion
The present study estimated the amount of avoided deforestation resulting from the payment
policy for conservation called the SBP. In order to avoid bias estimates of program impact due
to the lack of randomness in the treatment assignment (i.g. participation in SBP) and to obtain
an unbiased estimate of the effect of this conservation policy, we used the matching method, as
has been done in other empirical studies [15, 28, 45, 57]. According to Robalino, Sandoval [19]
and Blackman, Pfaff [58], the matching method allows for control of the selection bias in esti-
mates of avoided deforestation, because the allocation of conservation policies (e.g., SBP, pro-
tected areas, payment for environmental services) is not performed randomly.
Based on the matching technique, we can answer the counterfactual question regarding
what would have happened in the tropical Andean forest had the SBP not been implemented.
The study revealed that the SBP was effective at preventing the loss of forest areas. The pro-
gram was more effective in forests with individual contracts than in forests with collective con-
tracts. If the SBP had not been implemented, between 1.5% and 3.4% of forests would have
been deforested in 2014. These results are consistent with the percentages of avoided
Table 2. Balance of covariates.










Slope (˚) Unmatched 10.023 12.41 -21.94 2.3905 -0.1496
Matched 10.023 9.949 0.6803 0.1350 0.0236
Altitude (masl) Unmatched 560.45 802.29 -39.775 257.49 -0.2644
Matched 560.45 552.45 1.3155 9.5068 0.0061
Distance to national roads
(km)
Unmatched 81.616 41.083 65.638 40.525 0.5528
Matched 81.616 80.684 1.509 2.0586 0.0295
Distance to local roads (km) Unmatched 48.564 23.217 68.138 25.342 0.5947
Matched 48.564 47.855 1.9059 0.7863 0.0554
Distance to villages (km) Unmatched 12.278 9.2756 39.981 3.0604 0.2794
Matched 12.278 12.175 1.3684 0.1681 0.0167
Distance to rivers (km) Unmatched 7.9365 8.0214 -1.2433 1.7523 -0.0101
Matched 7.9365 7.1594 11.38 0.7921 -0.0100
Distance to forest borders
(km)
Unmatched 6.1542 3.4012 55.436 2.7623 0.4146
Matched 6.1542 5.2885 17.433 0.8181 0.0104
Average rainfall (mm) Unmatched 2789 2610.7 25.497 282.1 0.1502
Matched 2789.7 2786.6 0.4448 10.916 0.0115
Average temperature (˚C) Unmatched 23.277 22.204 37.863 1.5169 0.1446
Matched 23.277 23.299 -0.7518 0.0757 -0.0026
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203545.t002
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deforestation reported by other studies that assessed the impact of similar conservation poli-
cies [8, 15, 25, 28, 58].
Although the present study did not focus directly on the difference in SBP impacts between
individual and collective contracts, we assume that this gap can be explained by linking defor-
estation pressure (deforestation rate in the absence of protection) and the observed deforesta-
tion rate under the SBP [58]. According to MAE [38], the majority of the land covered by
individual contracts is located 500 meters from a deforested area, and deforestation pressure is
higher than for land covered by collective contracts. Under these circumstances, the individual
SBP contracts are more effective at helping to avoid deforestation when compared to the coun-
terfactual assumptions of what would be expected in their absence. Conversely, collective con-
tracts reduce deforestation in areas with relatively low pressure of forest loss. The literature on
common property and collective-community management of forests has generally been posi-
tive with respect to the potential for safe-land ownership to support customary standards and
local institutions [59]. The literature is full of examples of institutions/associations for commu-
nity management that have been successful in land management [6, 59, 60]. The majority of
the examples cited provide a rich descriptive inference about the design and operation of the
institutions at the community level; however, they do not necessarily reveal explicit counter-
factual outcomes that allow the impact of conservation programs to be estimated. The present
study contributes to the literature that assesses conservation programs based on robust meth-
ods and reveals that, at the individual level, the SBP is quite effective [17].
When the effectiveness of conservation policies is estimated, studies may try to make com-
parisons between conservation policies implemented within and outside the relevant areas, or
to compare the outcomes obtained before and after the establishment of the conservation pol-
icy [61–63]. According to Andam, Ferraro [45], these estimates may be strongly biased. To
illustrate this fact, in the present study, conventional methods would have estimated the
avoided deforestation due to the SBP to be between 5% and 7% (i.e., two to three times higher
impact of the SBP than that reported by the matching technique). Estimates of the impact of
the SBP on deforestation were significantly lower than those generated by conventional meth-
ods, which do not control for the lack of randomness in the treatment assignment [8, 53].
According to Blackman, Pfaff [58], these estimates are a common finding in the assessment of
forest conservation policies that use the matching technique and other quasi-experimental
strategies [19, 57, 58, 64, 65].
As expected, authors of previous studies were not aware of the use of the matching tech-
nique to address the factors that might hide the relationship between SBP and avoided defores-
tation. This fact has characterized multifold investigations on SBP due to a weak empirical
basis [66, 67].
Since the creation of the SBP, the Ecuadorian government has invested around 56 million
dollars in collective and private contracts to achieve its conservation goals [68]. The present
study suggests that this investment should be increased if a reduction in the deforestation rate
is one of the primary goals of the SBP, given that substantial rates of forest loss have been
reported in Ecuador [28, 30, 69]. On the other hand, the positive impact of the SBP on defores-
tation at the local level is an indicator of Ecuadorian efforts to preserve the tropical Andean
forest according to its new Constitution, which established that the State will reduce deforesta-
tion and preserve the forests (Article 414) [70]. At the global level, the results indicate that the
conservation efforts being made by Ecuador to avoid deforestation are in line with the efforts
of various other countries [15, 45, 55, 58, 71, 72].
According to Cao, Zhong [42], mechanisms that consider the contribution of both environ-
mental and human aspects to human development are more likely to provide appropriate
long-term measures through which people can escape from poverty than those that consider
Avoided deforestation in the tropical Andean forest
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human aspects alone. Such mechanisms can improve both nature and society. It seems that
the SBP could be such a mechanism [6].
Implications of the study
The role played by tropical forests in the climate and carbon cycle has a direct relationship
with current/future deforestation rates and the amount of forest that remains preserved or
could increase carbon reserves [73]. This reveals the importance of measuring avoided defores-
tation in a robust way to prevent under or overestimates of policy impact. For example, an
overestimate of avoided deforestation might indicate that the goals of the SBP have been ful-
filled; however, this may not be the case. In contrast, there might be higher deforestation rates
than those reported by conventional methods.
On the other hand, the SBP is part of the REDD+ national strategy, which is being imple-
mented in Ecuador in the form of credits from avoided deforestation in order to preserve for-
ests [74, 75]. In such schemes, estimating avoided deforestation in a robust way is of
paramount importance, to allow buyers or sellers to negotiate credits from GHG emissions.
This procedure should be performed through correct calculations and without diverting efforts
to maintain the carbon resulting from forest conservation [45].
The assessments of impacts―such as those performed in the present study―could use
behavioral experiments and field surveys (aspects not addressed in the present study) to con-
nect incentives, institutions and decisions on the use of the soil with the outcomes of avoided
deforestation in the tropical Andean forest [64].
Based on the findings of the present study, the SBP could improve its design by: 1) studying
the optimal distance at which to achieve efficient interaction among conservation policies, 2)
analyzing the relationship between deforestation pressure and SBP location (i.e. what would
have happened had the SBP not been implemented), 3) identifying sensitive SBP sites at which
higher rates and pressures of deforestation were observed (i.e., where the SBP claims greater
avoided deforestation) and 4) incorporating a landscape approach in which the SBP payment
of the SBP allows the integration of landscape conservation with sustainable development.
Conclusion
The SBP is an initiative to preserve forests and reduce GHG emissions caused by deforesta-
tion. The present study conducted an empirical analysis that revealed, for the first time, the
impact of the SBP on avoided deforestation by comparing individual and collective SBP
contracts. The results indicated that if the SBP had not been implemented, the deforestation
rate would have been higher. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the results are
only related to the effect of the SBP on deforestation. The SBP may have had a broad and
positive effect on local ways of life or incomes as well as on the ecological properties of the
tropical Andean forest; however, this effect is not quantifiable through categorical variables
of the forest. The present study did not attempt to address these issues, but further studies
could consider them.
Given the impact of the SBP on society and nature, it is necessary to implement periodic
assessment programs to determine not only the role of the SBP on deforestation but also its
impact with respect to human wellbeing. In this way, the SBP should be recognized as a
national initiative that may contribute to the mitigation of global climate change; therefore,
the financing of the SBP for all 20 years of the contracts must be protected through a national
and international commitment.
Avoided deforestation in the tropical Andean forest
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